Country Risk Analysis
Management of Credit Risk at
times goes beyond just managing a portfolio of corporates and FIs. At the macro
level, we may have to allocate country limits for cross border exposures or at
times may have to underwrite a Sovereign with regards to investments into its
debt securities or public sector entities.
Viewing a Company or an FI,
despite how large it may, would appear as an achievable task, spelling out from
the very basic business model to its earnings ability or debt management. But
what about a country? How do we comprehend its enormous budgets, deficits,
geo-political risks and currency management? Well, we will have to take it one
bit at a time, and then try to pull it all together as a puzzle and pray it
makes sense.
I’ve listed below the major building
blocks of Country analysis and how to approach each of those.
1. GDP
Gross Domestic Product, as the name goes, shows what gets produced in a country in a year. Now how do we estimate that? You can’t possibly add up all the invoices raised by all manufacturing and service entities of the Country - so you look at it from a different angle - from the consumers who used up all that production. The basic premise is that all that was produced was consumed by different participants in the economy, namely:
C.
Household Consumers, who
ate up all end products and services.
I.
Private Investments, who purchased
all the machineries and equipment.
G.
Government, who purchased
all the roads, bridges and factories that was made, paid the public servants,
teachers.
X.
Then there are exports that
didn’t get consumed in the country, but it was produced here, so you add that
up.
M.
Then there are imports that
you consumed in the country, but didn’t get produced here, so you deduct that.
So
to summarize, GDP is calculated as Y = C + I + G + X - M
We are really
not getting into how statisticians estimate this, because we analysts would
work on available data - but its worth noting that GDP only covers final goods
and services - it eliminates all intermediate goods or raw material production,
quite obviously to avoid double counting. So when you look from end consumer
angle, this is automatically taken care of. Also informal works, household
chores, informal unorganized sector, which does not really report its activity
anywhere, illegal works etc are not counted.
While GDP shows
us the overall scale of an economy, its also important to analyze the
composition. If a country has a high GDP attributed to Government spending,
then that may not last long. That may just having a crowding out effect on
private investments. If GDP has a strong component of private investment, then
there is an efficient capital market functioning and chasing yields may result in long term benefits. A strong
consumer base is also relevant, because you really don’t have to be exposed to
trade shocks - a good consumer base can keep the economic engine ticking - ex.
China. Then there is the net exports - its good to have a surplus but not
overly dependent.
How does various countries fare in this aspect? Refer graph below, where countries are ranked top to bottom based on their S&P ratings. The composition varies across the rating class, but towards the lower end you could see very low government spending, again which would show the lack of ability of government to spent on investments, while the large consumer base is being fed using imports, rather than inhouse production. Nevertheless, you can see that Household consumption is a major component across the world and drives the GDP.
2. Debt to GDP
A very widely
used metric is Debt to GDP. Maastricht treaty for Eurozone membership talks
about a 60% max level for debt to GDP. But what is Debt to GDP? Is it like Debt
to EBITDA? Or is it like Debt to Income? Neither, this is merely a measure of
Debt Burden - it shows the total national debt against a country’s size of
economy. If you think of a country as a household, then GDP is what the
household produced and sold the whole year, while debt (also called public debt
or national debt or sovereign debt) is the debt taken by the guy who runs the
household, on behalf of the household.
So in simple
terms, if the father takes the debt and uses all of the household’s revenues to
pay it off, that is a country dedicate all of its GDP for debt repayment, how
many years would it take to repay? A 50% debt to GDP would mean half an year of
repayment, a 200% debt to GDP would mean 2 years of toil to settle all of
public debt. You get the idea. But that’s a bit too much right? You really wont
be taking GDP created by all the companies and individuals in the country and
use it to settle Government debt. Government at the most would only have access
to the tax that can be generated on this GDP and of course that component of
GDP that they themselves produced (say, national oil companies). This does not
show debt affordability or serviceability. So what does debt to GDP actually
say? It gives the following indicators:
-
Indirectly, it shows the
size of debt relative to overall scale of Government’s revenue base - because
GDP is what Government can tax. A larger economy also means a broader capital
market access which can be tapped by the Government to issue more debt. Hence
ability to repay is a function of how big is it, relative to GDP size.
-
An elevated debt level to
GDP constrains the sovereign’s capacity to provide fiscal support to the
economy, especially in times of need, impacting its growth. This is because a
large debt would mean larger interest payments in the budget, leaving only the
reminer for boosting growth.
-
It shows that the Country
was/is running persistent deficits which built up debt gradually. As per
Moody’s this shows legacy weakness. As debt goes higher, incremental debt
becomes costlier, making it harder to manage deficits which may lead to a
recession.
-
Apart from legacy weakness,
it would also show contingent liabilities that the Government was forced to
take up in the past, like recapitalization of loss making state owned
enterprises, debt taken to manage currency depreciation etc.
We like this
ratio to be below 60% and okay even if its around 80%. But beyond that, it is
considered high. You have to be careful of what constitute debt in the ratio
you are looking at - In all normal scenarios, debt to GDP is ‘public debt’ against
country’s GDP. This public debt may include debt at provinces/states and debt
at large state owned entities, if data is available and material.

As seen above, a
larger economy like the USA may be running debt above 100% and that would be
ok, but a smaller economy like Greece and Lebanon running 150% debt would not
be ok. You get the drift, right? That’s what debt to GDP shows.
For a sovereign, what is Debt to EBITDA then?
To realistically
assess a sovereign’s repayment capacity, we need to move ahead from Debt burden
to assess the Debt Affordability. We can use the following indicators:
-
Government Interest
Payments to Government revenues, which would be influenced by
o
The debt burden itself as
seen above (scale of debt relative to size of economy) - higher debt means
higher interest payments.
o
Cost of debt - which shows
the risk premia.
o
Government revenues in its
budget - lower revenue means lower debt serviceability.
-
General government debt to general
government revenue - this is more like a debt/EBITDA and shows the repayment
capacity.
-
Government revenue to GDP
or tax revenue to GDP, as per data availability, which shows the footprint of
Government earnings against the national economic activity. This sort of shows
how wide the tax net is and how efficient is government in its collections. A
very efficient economy, like Norway has a very high government revenue to GDP
level, close to 60%, followed by Denmark, France, Finland all closing around
50%. Saudi Arabia, even with all its oil, has only revenues covering 30% of GDP
given the very low tax net. US too has it close to 30% but with half of it
coming from taxes.
Composition of this public debt?
Not all debts
are created equal and hence our analysis needs to be make adjustments for them.
-
LCY debt from domestic
creditors - more easily accessed, refinanced. A deep local domestic capital
market is hence considered a credit strength for a country, if it helps
government to issue various types of instruments of various maturities. Developed
countries normally have a deep domestic market for its government bonds.
Another option for the Government to tap funds locally
is through the banking channel. We see this in Egypt and Pakistan, where the
banks hold their funds primarily with government bonds, given the lack of solid
credit growth opportunities in those countries. This is advantageous if such
demand from banks for government bonds is stable, driven by conservative
approach and there are advantages on regulatory frameworks that support such
government holdings - but this would lead to saturation - if this demand from
banks taper out, then Government may find it hard to raise further funds.
Such a domestic market would depend on a stable and
lower inflation target (as the investors would want a real return on such government
bonds) and a wider set of participants, like insurance companies, pension funds
etc who has the business need to face higher duration on investments.
-
LCY borrowing from
external creditors - Mainly relates to the FIIs who shops around for
government debt, either for the high yield (in case of developing nations) or
for risk aversion (US treasuries, bunds etc). This widens a government’s
borrowing base and provides easier access (take our example of Egypt and
Pakistan above, such broader access would reduce reliance on Banking network).
In addition to domestic pension funds or insurance companies, you are also now
looking into foreign investors. There are many emerging markets opening up,
mainly Indonesia. This depends upon capital account frameworks, FDI laws etc. Indian
government bonds are soon expected to be inducted into the FTSE Russel index,
which would further broaden its investor base.
-
FCY Borrowings, from
domestic creditors: See the graphic below, Emerging market economies
normally hold less of FCY borrowings and even if they do that, it may be FCY
borrowings from domestic investors.

-
FCY borrowings,
typically from external creditors. This broadens the market access
substantially, as the investors does not have to take currency depreciation
risk. This alleviates liquidity risk to a large extent, depending upon track
record and stability of such issuances in the past. Also, if last resort
lenders like IMF and other official parties are the main investors, then it
wont necessarily show breadth of the market, but rather weakness in accessing
other investors.
However, FCY
debt as a component of total debt, above say 40%, opens up its own set of
problems:
o
Value of debt in LCY terms
or relative to LCY revenues becomes larger if the currency depreciates.
o
Currency depreciation may
also lead to higher interest rates.
-
The ease of access is then
assessed against the urgency of access. The stronger the access, higher the
tolerance for funding needs. Large principal repayments coming due in FCY poses
risk, including nervous investor base, pressure on currency if you refinance in
LCY to repay FCY and chances that you may deplete your reserves in order to
service the repayment.
2.
The current account
deficits
The current
account deficit shows the net position of transactions between a Country’s
residents and non-residents. This includes exports, imports, workers
remittances, grants, dividend income, dividend payouts, interest income and
payouts (basically current account items, not capital movements). If this
account goes into deficit, this will have to be plugged by bringing in funds
from outside the country. This would lead to borrowings at government level to
match its balance of payments. Egypt normally takes such borrowings at its oil
company levels to fund import of oil.
A deficit indirectly
means that you are sending more money abroad (for purchases, cost of debt etc),
than what is coming in to your country (as interest income, export proceeds
etc). Now if you then take debt to plug this, then you are becoming a debtor to
the world for funding consumption and not long term growth.
A current
account deficit is also viewed as lower level of savings in a country vs. its
investments. How is that? In a country, what is saved by the residents is what
gets invested - theoretically. Savings go into the banking system, which goes
out as loans for investments. Now, if people stop saving and starts spending,
then obviously it would require more imports and hence a deficit. Now, with no
savings, there is no funds for investments as well, which requires capital
flows from abroad (CA deficit = capital inflows). Conversely, if a Country
saves a lot, it doesn’t spend much, that means it would import less expensive
cars, TVs etc. It would then have a current account surplus and so much
savings, that they will start looking for opportunities abroad to invest.
Capital flows outside (CA surplus = capital outflow). Now this savings/investments approach means
that protectionism doesn’t work and has no impact on current account deficit -
because, protectionism doesn’t impact savings and investments.
Current account
deficit also means that the country is focused on short term consumption
(imports) than longer term investments in export sector. Such deficits
naturally depreciates local currency, given that there is strong requirement of
dollars to fund the deficit. This makes imports costlier, which then pushes the
deficit wider and results in inflation. This in a way makes exports attractive,
increases demand and may help in the long run. If it’s a floating rate, market
forces would adjust itself.
Hence, its
imperative to understand how the deficit is financed. You then look into
capital account and the financial account. Capital account is the book of
tangible assets - money that went out to buy tangible assets net of money that
came in for same purpose. If more investors are buying companies in our country
and piling money into our account for that, then yes, that excess fund will
then plug the deficit in current account. It’s a good thing if we are funding
the current account deficit through long term investments coming into the
country, and not just debt. Such long term investments will then increase
productivity, which may lead to lower imports or higher exports and then arrest
the deficit altogether. If the Country enjoys stable inflows of FDI, provides
good return to investors, then that would be considered an acceptable
proposition.
But how far can
persistent deficit continue? You are at the end of the day financing a deficit
through liabilities taken on the world, which needs to be repaid. If you are
borrowing to fund consumption with no longer term benefits, then its ability to
repay may be curtailed. Like a corporate, is the borrowing resulting in
incremental EBITDA? So these borrowings should go into finance investments with
a higher marginal production rate than the interest paid on these foreign
liabilities. To repay debt taken to fix CA, you should eventually return to CA
surplus. Now some countries are just able to run consistent deficits and gets
capital inflows to plug it (Australia, USA), but some countries (like the Asian
countries during 1997 crisis) would just see an arrest of capital inflows to
fund the deficits and gets massive shock to its currency as it finds it hard to
get FX.
So is current
account deficit good or bad?
o
Case for good: If
its funded by a stable FDI inflow, country has a stable exchange regime, not
exposed to trade shocks, a well regulated banking sector, good import cover,
diversified export base not dependent on any partners, then deficit may not be
that bad. Also, if deficit is due to higher investments than savings, which
would just mean a country raring to go, to invest, and there is no enough
savings domestically to fund it.
o
Case for bad: If the
deficit is because of low savings (and not high investment) and reflects issues
with competitiveness on the export front, lack of austerity measures pushing up
consumption, it may not be all that good. Also if country is just taking short
term debt (rather than FDI) to just plug the consumption and not investing in
improving competitiveness and yield so as to reverse the position later on,
then a persistent deficit would backfire.
IMF lists out
the following major risk factors for current account deficits:
o
Overvalued currency which
makes inflows costly.
o
Inadequate forex reserves
to give stability for imports.
o
Excessive domestic credit
growth which may result in a banking sector meltdown.
o
Unfavorable terms of trade
shocks
o
Low growth in partner
countries impacting exports,
o
Increasing balance sheet
vulnerabilities at corporate levels.
o
Increasing ADRs at banking
sector which shows borrowings from abroad to fund weaker domestic credits.
o
Composition of capital
inflows - stable FDIs vs short term investment flows into capital markets
(equities and bonds).
3.
The budget Deficits
a.
Fiscal Deficit =
Government’s expenditure - income. This also means the borrowing requirement of
the Government.
b.
Primary Deficit = Borrowing
requirement as above - interest expense of previous borrowings. This basically
shows how much of the deficit is excluding interest expenses and taken to meet
other expenses of the Government.
Looking at it backwards,
Primary Deficit = Government’s
expenditure (excluding interest payments on previous debt) - income.
Fiscal
Deficit = Primary deficit + interest expense of previous debt.
So if a country is running a primary
deficit, it means that its having a deficit even before considering interest
payments - i.e., it is not making enough money to even service debt. So more
borrowings to even pay interest. That’s not that good. As interest rate goes
up, interest expense shoots up and fiscal deficit grows even bigger, pushing
debt to GDP even higher. Now if you run a primary deficit, then government can
either reduce spending or increase taxes to plug the deficit OR it can just
keep on printing money to make payments - now all economies does not have that
easy way out. Such excessive growth in money supply (too much money chasing too
few assets) would lead to inflation, which would then lead to further deficits.
Now what are the
effects of a persistent budget deficit?
Positive:
A deficit arising from high government spending would help an economy recover
faster from a recession, provide jobs etc. If its for infrastructure projects,
then it would mean money going into contractors, material suppliers etc, basically
bills getting paid, which is a good thing for economy. A deficit would help in
implementing socialist welfare programs, bring in political stability etc.
Negative:
Such high level of government spending and resultant government borrowing
pushes interest rates higher, which then impacts cost of funding for private
sector and leads to lower private investments, thus dragging the economy. If
government starts issuing bonds substantially and increases the rate in order
to get maximum subscription, then other bonds needs to be priced at a premium
to this rate - thus increasing cost in the economy (may not have much of an
impact if the economy is stuck at near zero interest rates).
Also, if
Government issues bonds and notes and all savings goes into those assets, then
there wont be any left for credit growth. Private investment is always
considered more productive and capitalist than public spending, so such
deficits would carry negative impacts in the long term. Thus a deficit reduces capital available in an
economy (think about open market operations of Fed - It would sell its holding
of US Treasuries to suck out extra funds kept with banks - which leads to
higher interest rates and buy treasuries if it wants to give more money to
banks, thereby making loans easier and cheaper - when Fed just keeps on
printing money to buy these bonds and flush economy with cash, that’s called QE).
So how we
analyze it?
o
See if the economy is
running a primary deficit. Is that persistent? For ex, India has been running a
fiscal deficit for last 40 years.
o
Is this deficit boosting the
economy? Are the contractors getting paid and is the deficit used for
productive investments? Or is it just welfare economics? Or is it just
mismanagement or poor taxation programs? Or is it just defense spending?
o
Is debt to GDP increasing
year on year to fund the same?
o
Can they keep on printing
money to manage this borrowing? Is there a risk of inflation?
o
Especially in COVID time,
Governments would be forced to spent more to keep the economic clock ticking.
Is it something that can be addressed and are there chances of a recovery soon?
4.
GDP Per Capita
While not exactly
true in all aspects, this metrics basically shows how prosperous a country is,
at least in terms of wealth available for each participant of the economy. It
does not capture the disparity of this allocation (Something that a gini
coefficient may pick up) or happiness metric of a country - just total wealth
divided by population. Nevertheless, this is seen as higher in developed
nations (see US below) or in very small counties (see Singapore below) - but
with countries arranged from best to worse in credit rating - you can see that
the GDP per capita sort of tapers down as we get to the other end.

If a country has a
lower per capita base, say $1000, a 10% growth would mean only adding $100 more
to it and country can plan for it, but if its already at $100,000, then adding
10% would mean $10,000 per head which may not be easy.
5.
GDP Growth
As important as GDP,
we should also keep an eye to GDP Growth. More importantly, it should be the
Real GDP growth, which takes out the impact of inflation. If a Country’s
nominal GDP grew from 1,000 to 1,100, that’s a 10% growth, but if country had a
8% inflation, then actual growth would be only 2%, as an example. Also, we
can’t keep a blanket benchmark of say 7% growth for all countries we are
analyzing - as is the case with per capita, a larger base would only allow for
a 2-3% growth while developing economies with smaller base should thrive for a
7-10% growth rate. In current situation when 2020 was battered by COVID, the
base is low for many countries and hence 2021, being recovery year, may come up
with good growth rates, but that may still be lower than where we stood in
2019. The map looks all green now, but that’s because of the lower base - see
2020 on the left - COVID effect and the greener 2021 on the right, with strong
growth rates given the lower base of 2020.

So let’s go back
one more year to have a normal distribution - no COVID, no recovery from COVID,
just normal economics. See below for 2019 - that’s more like it - the
developing nations like India and China would thrive for a 3-6% growth, while
the developed economies would have a 0-3% growth.

6.
Forex Reserves and Import
Cover
One of the
lessons learned by emerging markets from the Asian crisis of the 90s is that
they need to maintain a good forex reserve balance. Primarily this helps
maintain the value of the currency, if suddenly capital flow stops and people
start dumping the LCY to take funds out. A good forex base helps in maintaining
LCY purchases to maintain its value and also provides comfort on FX available
to meet the country’s imports - its always good to have minimum 4 months of
imports in the reserves.
A country’s
forex is primarily built up through its exporters, who receive FCY against
their invoices as credit to their bank accounts (or FCY cash that they deposit
into the banking system). Banks gives them LCY in return and move this FCY
currency to Central bank in return for LCY. Banks needs LCY for their local
banking operations and the exporters need LCY for meeting their local expenses.
Hence eventually FCY ends up with Central Bank - and what do they do with it?
Buy dollar or euro denominated sovereign bonds (US Treasuries mainly), even
high yielding corporate bonds to certain extent and even keep it with IMF as
reserve balances. A part may even be
held converted and held in gold.
Among other
things, Central Banks built up reserves to manage currency rate (mainly to buy
FCY and keep LCY competitive), maintain liquidity in terms of import cover -
even in case exporters stop earning FCY temporarily due to a trade shock,
government would still be able to use its reserves to provide dollars to fund
imports, keep markets steady in case of a capital flight from the economy, maintain
ability to meet FCY debt payments and use it for investments abroad or even as
a war chest if required, for domestic investments.
IMF uses a
metric called Reserve Adequacy, which captures the following dynamics:
o
Reserves to cover 20% of
M2 Broad Money. A country should keep enough reserves to cover a portion of
cash and bank deposits with maturity less than 2 years - this is to capture FX
requirements which potential capital flight happens, when confidence in LCY is
lost and investors (both domestic and foreign) liquidates savings held in cash
and deposits and covert it to FCY. Even domestic investors would be interested
in moving their assets abroad. Now this risk is exacerbated if the currency
regime is considered very volatile (say Turkey), where investors expect massive
devaluations and hence it may be better to convert the holding to FCY now or if
the banking sector is considered very weak and investors consider keeping money
with the banks as risky.
o
Import Coverage: As
mentioned before, ideally covering 3-6 months of imports, to capture FX
requirements during a balance of payments crisis, when exports narrow and no
other FX revenue is available.
o
Coverage against short
term external debt: The rule states that the FX reserve should cover debts
maturing within one year. While import cover would capture balance of payments
risk, this indicator covers the volatility in capital transactions. Basically,
this ratio says that a country should be able to live without any new foreign
borrowing for up to one year and still be able to meet its short term external
debt repayments (both LCY ad FCY denominated).
The recently published position of IMF Reserve
Requirements in emerging markets shown below.
EMEs have
experienced frequent crises since the 1980s: Latin America in the 1980s, Mexico
in 1995, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, Turkey in 1994 and 2001, Brazil in
1999, and Argentina in 2002 and 2018. One salient characteristic of these
crises has been sudden stops in capital flows, which have disrupted the
financial system and caused large and mostly permanent output losses. This has
led to EMs slowly taking an insurance by building up reserves. A pictorial
representation of FX reserves as a % of its GDP (that is amount of reserves
held with regards to the scale of the economy) and its import cover given
below.

7.
Banking Sector
Can a Country’s
banking sector take the Country down as it goes haywire? Quite obviously, it
would depend on the size of the banking sector relative to the economy (total
banking sector assets to GDP) and strength of the sector, without any
government assistance. Many a times in recent past, we have seen Government
stepping in to bail out banks which would add to Government’s debt burden or
deplete its reserves. If the size of domestic banking assets to GDP is less
than 80%, no material impact is expected, but if its say above 200%, that’s
worth taking into consideration.
We are not going
in detail on banking sector analysis here, but presence of weaker state owned
banks with depleted capital position and high levels of legacy NPA levels, generally
would show years of mismanagement and dire need for recapitalization, which
then puts pressure on budget deficits and debt levels (say, Bangladesh). But if
the banking sector is well capitalized, good management of assets and
liquidity, then that can be a credit positive for a country, while it manages
other challenges (Say Turkey). Also, if a banking sector is running too low an
ADR and not really contributing to credit growth of a country, with assets
mainly tied up with government bonds, then that increases the correlation risk
(like Egypt and Bangladesh). A good regulator keeping banks in check and acting
independent is a huge plus. Weak governance structures, favored connected
lending, high concentration etc are huge negatives. A good banking sector
results in efficient allocation of resources, even credit growth and a
resultant even growth rate.
8.
Inflation
This is a double
edged sword which needs to be controlled carefully. Inflation basically means
higher amount of money in an economy chasing far fewer goods. Low inflation
encourages consumption which leads to further investments to increase
production, further employments and wage increases. But when this inflation
becomes too high, economy starts suffering - people find it hard to make ends
meet and then government intervenes by raising interest rates and sucking out
funds from the economy. This reduces demand and stabilizes prices.
When a country
increases its money supply and more currency is available in the country, it
chases existing set of goods and inflation creeps up. Now that may not be the
case in US, because these excess dollars gets utilized by other countries
holding the same as reserve currency and hence there is no increased supply
domestically and hence inflation may remain muted. Then there is the concept of
exporting inflation. For example when US prints a lot of dollars, dollar supply
increases which mathematically weakens the dollar. The emerging economies find
it hard when its currency strengthens, as it impacts export competitiveness,
and then in turn starts measures to devalue its currency - say through dollar
purchases - which sucks out dollar from US domestic market and ensures there is
no inflation in US, but as currency gets devalued, imports gets expensive to
these countries, who then starts facing food and commodity inflation. SO
effectively, US just exported inflation to other counties. This is an element
of trade war.
Coming back to
the topic of analyzing inflation for country analysis, I would say keep an eye
on inflation above 10% - those countries are bleeding and may be facing severe
stress on its currency. Higher inflation means purchasing power of its currency
is going downhill, which essentially means currency will weaken. Now it’s a
chicken and egg situation - this further makes imports costlier. Inflation will
also lead to higher interest rates - that’s because government bonds becomes
unattractive as they don’t cover inflation and government will be forced to
issue new bonds with better yields, which then makes credit linked to bond
prices costlier.
9.
Exchange Rates
Historically, this
is something that has broken the back of several economies. Its always
advisable to have a flexible exchange rate, one that moves along with the
market - but some countries do try to keep it fixed or pegged for various
reasons - one being it favors foreign investments - investors wont really like
the currency to have devalued over a year which would wipe out their returns
for that year. It will also help if you are majorly dependent on a particular commodity
which is traded in dollars and want to take out forex risk from the equation -
you would know what you will earn when you produce and also your customers know
how much to pay - you don’t want them to walk away to another country only
because your exports became costlier (through a dollar weakness).
But this peg has
to be at an appropriate level. If you keep it the peg too low, that is your
currency is very weak, say INR at 150 for a dollar, then purchasing power of
domestic consumers is very low. For 15000 Rs, they can only import 100 dollar
worth of goods. India would hence reduce their imports, impacting business of
US and Middle East countries, losing India as a trade partner. Hence currency
cannot be too undervalued or weak.
What if its held
too high or too strong, say INR at 30 per dollar, that’s too much power to
consume so much - that will lead to high deficits, impact the country’s credit
rating and market would push the currency down - government will have to use up
all of its reserves to defend the peg and eventually give up. Something like
Soros breaking the back of the Bank of England. Losing a peg has huge short
term ramifications - imports becomes expensive, you lose suppliers, investors
lose their returns, inflation creeps up. Think Egypt when they decided to
devalue the currency after IMF intervention. But overtime, markets adjust to
the devalued currency as exports becomes attractive, tourism booms and
investors adjust expectations to the new normal.
Most past
sovereign defaults have been surprisingly linked to coming off a peg -
Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico. In all these cases, a
persistent current account deficit and depletion of forex reserves which deemed
it insufficient to defend a peg, led to capital flight and eventual defaults by
these sovereigns.
Lessons from the past:
Now that we have covered the
basic blocks of country analysis, it would be good to go through some of the
major global financial meltdowns and see what went wrong:
-
Asian Crisis of late 90s
- The Asian countries in 1990s enjoyed a stable exchange rate, high
interest rate on domestic deposits and rapid economic growth coming from these
investments - current and budget deficits being funded by external flows. A
rising current account deficit was being plugged by these foreign inflows -
however, these inflows were understood to be going into productive investments
and not just to fund consumerism and hence many decided to overlook the same. Also
a lot of debt was being raised by private sector directly - which does not show
up at government level economic ratios.
But the type of debt is also important - if this was
long term FDI flow, that would have been ok - but here it was more of short
term interest hunting foreign funds and that too in FCY. Such debt depends on
timely rollovers through ample liquidity and stability in exchange rates so
that returns don’t get eroded away. But here, short term debt was invested in
domestic assets and there was no FCY income per se to repay FCY debt One wrong
news about the economy and an erosion of confidence, would take out liquidity
and stability in exchange rates - that’s what happened - trigger was the
discovery that Thailand’s reserves had been overstated - that would mean that
Thailand wouldn’t have the reserves necessary to maintain the exchange rate - this
led to doubts on reserves of other countries as well and lead to a classic bank
run, but on the countries.
Countries have learned following lessons from the
crisis:
o
Have an efficient banking
sector to keep confidence in investors, have a credible regulator.
o
Maintain exchange rate
flexibility ,
o
Manageable debt to GDP
levels
o
An independent regulator
ensuring an inflation targeting policy or exchange stability.
o
Have a good reserve base to
make the country resilient to external shocks.
-
Barbados Default 2018 - fiscal
deficits averaged to around 8% of GDP with large requirements for transfer to
state owned enterprises and high interest expenditure. Public Debt to GDP went
from 77% to 158%, with composition shifting from long term to short term
gradually - leading to unsustainable maturities and credit downgrades. Import
cover fell from 4 months to 5 weeks between 2007 to 2017. They finally
defaulted to maintain their reserves. Larger component of debt was domestic,
with banks and insurance companies.
-
Venezuela Default 2017 -
Larger issue of mismanagement and corruption, despite having one of the largest
oil reserves in the world.
-
Russian Financial Crisis
1998 - In hindsight, economists say that a fixed exchange rate of Ruble vs
major currencies and a chronic fiscal deficit were the reasons that led to the
crisis.
I’ve summarized
below some available data on sovereigns, during years that lead up to its
default.
|
Metrics leading up to
Default |
Lebanon |
Argentina |
Barbados |
Venezuela |
Greece |
|
Default Year |
2020 |
2020 |
2018 |
2017 |
2015 |
|
GDP (USD bn) |
36 |
383 |
5 |
93 |
195 |
|
Growth rate last three
years |
(11.3) |
(4.9) |
0.9 |
(19.0) |
(3.0) |
|
Debt to GDP (last 3
years average) |
165.0 |
91.8 |
100.3 |
181.0 |
173.0 |
|
Debt to Govt Revenue
(last 3 years avg) |
867.7 |
508.7 |
362.0 |
NA |
361.0 |
|
Inflation year of
default |
146.0 |
36.1 |
0.6 |
863.0 |
0.4 |
|
Budget Deficit Average
of last 3 years (% of GDP) |
(9.8) |
(5.8) |
(4.5) |
(15.0) |
(7.5) |
|
Trade Deficit Average of
last 3 years (% of GDP) |
(20.4) |
(1.9) |
(4.0) |
(0.1) |
(1.9) |
|
Forex Reserve Position
($bn) |
18.6 |
33.9 |
0.5 |
10.0 |
1.5 |
|
Currency per dollar |
3500 |
84 |
2.0 |
10.0 |
0.9 |
|
Devaluation over last 3
years |
132% |
419% |
- |
- |
21% |
Conclusion
It’s not always
easy to spot a sovereign treading a weaker path. It wont be easy to convince an
audience as to why you think a sovereign that’s investment grade or considered
too big to fail is actually at risk. Your best bet would be to focus on key
critical variables and use it to drive down the message - import cover, FX
stability, reserve adequacy and the component of public debt and also the
ancillary debt and debt requirements of a sovereign (arising from the banking
sector or SOEs). If you are convinced that the debt is affordable over your
investment horizon, take the plunge, or stick to your convictions and hold your
gun.
Cheers.



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